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Housing policy formulation should be informed by a careful understanding 
of the behaviour of the housing market, as reflected by housing demand. 
Such basic information is important, not only for improved project design but 
also for the development of better sector-wide policies. Housing is a 
complex outcome of cultural, economic and regulatory environment. 
Consistent estimates of price and income elasticity of housing demand are 
prerequisites for effective policy design. Results, from earlier studies on 
Japanese housing markets, are inconclusive and the estimates of price 
and income elasticity of housing demand vary over a wide range. It may be 
argued that measuring the volume of housing services as housing 
expenditure, as is done in previous research, essentially ignores the 
heterogeneity, and for large number of policy purposes like impact of tax on 
tenure choice, choice between owning and renting etc., the distribution of 
housing consumption into qualitatively different categories is of more 
interest than an aggregate qualitative measure of housing expenditure 
alone. This paper analyzes the demand for housing in Tokyo using a 
discrete choice model. Three dimensions of choice, tenure, dwelling size 
(as number of rooms) and structure type (as type of unit) determine demand 
for housing which are modeled simultaneously. The income elasticity of 
market share of ownership house is positive and ranges between 0.16 to 
0.34. However, income elasticity for rental houses is negative ranging 
between -0.17 to -0.57. The own price elasticities vary over a large range 
from -0.03 to -5.1 with smaller in magnitude for ownership houses and 




Housing demand; Discrete choice model; Nested Multinomial Logit Model. 66 Tiwari 




Housing is a basic necessity everywhere in the world. As such, housing can 
be thought of as the most universal property type, demand for which is 
directly related to population demographics and to micro- and macro- 
economic factors like income growth and government policies. The 
demographics and the culture-based household characteristics are all critical 
determinants of the aggregate demand for housing, while other factors – 
wealth, age distribution, affordability etc. – tend to determine the types of 
housing most in demand. State of housing is a complex outcome of 
government policies, affordability and systems of provision of housing. 
Many countries today are trying to take corrective measures to enhance 
efficiency of the housing market operations. For effective policy formulation it 
is essential to understand the underlying demand for housing i.e. How much 
of housing do people want? And, what kind of housing do households would 
be able to afford? 
 
This paper tries to analyze these questions for Tokyo (Japan). Tokyo 
Metropolitan Region (TMR) is one of the most populated metropolitan cities 
in the world with a population of around 33 million in 1994 (around 25% of 
Japan). The economic and geographical importance of Tokyo in the world has 
bestowed the status of being one of the most expensive real estate in the 
world. In a globalizing world, an analysis of housing demand in Tokyo is of 
interest to both domestic and the international community. Housing demand 
is a subject of research for many papers. Most papers relate to American or 
European housing markets. There is, however, paucity of research on 
housing markets in Japan, which is accessible to the international community. 
Japan has arguably one of the good household level data set on housing. 
Five papers to our knowledge have been written on housing demand for 
Japan
1  which differ in the methodologies, geographical coverage, data 
sources and hence the results (Tiwari and Hasegawa, 1999; Moriizumi, 1993; 
Horioka, 1988; Moriizumi and Takagi, 1983; Yamada et al., 1976). These 
studies attempt to estimate income and price elasticity of housing demand 
besides various factors that determine housing demand. However, the results 
from these studies vary so much that there is a need for another study with 
latest data and methodology. This paper adopts a discrete choice model, 
which earlier papers have not utilized. Housing or, more precise, the service 
                                                 
1 Here we review only those papers, which are published in Journals that communicate in 
English.  Author of the present paper is unable to review Japanese literature due to the 
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stream from a housing unit, is a heterogeneous commodity. Some dimensions 
such as size or age of structure, are measured on a continuous scale. Others, 
such as tenure or type of structure are discrete properties. Earlier studies 
measured the volume of housing services as housing expenditure essentially 
ignores the heterogeneity, and for large policy purposes, the distribution of 
housing consumption into qualitatively different categories is of more interest 
than an aggregate qualitative measure of housing alone.  
 
The main contribution of the present paper is the estimation of housing 
demand using a discrete choice framework for Tokyo. The discrete choice 
model that is used in this paper is nested multinomial logit model (NMNL). 
Housing demand is a function of price and various household specific 
variables like income, household size and age pattern of household head. The 
prime focus of this paper is to estimate demand f or housing in Tokyo 
prefecture comprising of 23 wards. Rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 is an overview presenting the specific features of housing market in 
Japan. Section 3 briefly presents statistical overview of the Tokyo housing 
market and housing characteristics based on the data. Section 4 reviews 
previous studies. Section 5 briefly presents the model. Section 6 constructs 
various variables used in estimation of demand function. Section 7 presents 
results of demand estimation and section 8 concludes. 
 
 
Features of Housing Market in Japan 
 
There are four major features that characterize Japanese housing markets and 
distinguish it from housing markets internationally. The first and the foremost 
is the widely accepted view that Japanese houses are small and extremely 
expensive. Kanemoto (1997) in his paper discusses this issue at length and 
compares size and price of Japanese houses with European and American 
housing markets.  He concludes that for overall Japan probably the size is not 
markedly different from international housing markets but houses in Tokyo 
are indeed small. Average ownership house is Tokyo has an area of around 
70 square meter and the average size of a rental house is 38 square meter. In 
contrast the average floor size of an ownership house in UK is 75 square 
meter and a rental house is 70 square meter (Kanemoto, 1997). The different 
between ownership and rental housing in Japan are substantial. Owner 
occupied housing and rental houses are not close substitutes because the 
two categories are very different in the number of rooms per home and in the 
floor area (Tachibanaki, 1994). The differences in the size have consequence 
for the household size as well. Single-family households or married couples 
without children tend to live in rental houses with a smaller number of rooms 68 Tiwari 
   
when they are young while older married households with children, and 
parents in some cases (called a joint family), tend to live in owner-occupied 
houses which are bigger in size. Getting married a nd having children are 
important determinants of switch from rental to ownership houses in Japan. 
The supply of good rental houses is also constrained by the Land Lease Law
2 
and Building Lease Law.  These provisions have rendered rental housing 
defunct and the supply of the rental houses is an outcome of these laws. 
There are many other constraints that act in the way of rental housing supply 
and this we will discuss later. 
 
Another feature of housing markets in Japan is the role that bequest plays in 
housing decisions. Bequest is an important motive in Japanese household 
and housing is one of the best forms of bequeathed wealth. Tachibanaki 
(1994) presents an interesting data which indicates that in Tokyo, of the total 
owner occupied houses, 45% were bequest or gifts. It may be emphasized 
here that the data used in his study are from 1989 survey on Financial Asset 
Choices of Households conducted by the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunication. Japan is an aging society and the average number of 
children per family has reduced significantly. Taking aging factor into 
account, the share of housing as bequest would be much higher. Besides this 
owner houses have considerable advantage in inheritance taxes. Up to 200 
square meter, the residential land is permitted automatic deduction 
(Kanemoto, 1997). The degree of desire to bequeath land and house increases 
as income level increases (Tachibanaki, 1994). This means that as income 
rises the desire to own a house becomes more and more strong. Tachibanaki 
(1994) shows that more than 50% of households in Japan in the age group of 
35-39 have their own houses. More than 70% of households above 40 years 
of age have their own house. 
                                                 
2 The Land lease law was strengthened during the World War II as social legislation with 
the aim of strengthening the right of the lessee by bending the principle of freedom of 
contract provided in the Civil Code. During the war, a large number of families were faced 
with the danger of being evicted from their leased land or houses while the head of the 
family was called for active military duty. With the view of protecting the right of lessee 
and tenant, the government strengthened these laws. Under the strengthened provisions, 
a land lease contract is automatically renewed when the term expires, unless the landlord 
makes a formal objection without delay. The new contract is assumed to continue for the 
period of thirty years. The objection of the landlord is admitted only if he can show a 
personal need for the use of land or other “just causes,” which are interpreted very 
strictly in the court. There are provisions for revision of rents but lessee or tenant can 
again approach court to determine “fair and reasonable rent.” Until court decides on the 
rent, tenant can continue to use the land by depositing an amount with the court that he 
deems justified for the rent of land. Landlords have very little negotiating leverage. The 
building lease law is similar in nature and exists for buildings (Noguchi, 1994).   Housing Demand in Tokyo 69 
 
 
The third feature of the housing markets in Japan is that the most desired 
type of housing is a moderately spacious single-family house with a garden. 
However, this notion is shifting primarily for affordability reasons (Yamada, 
1999). A survey conducted by Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (1988), right after the 
period of very high prices, indicates that 70% of renters and 60% of owners in 
Tokyo have given up their desire for such a house because of high price and 
have switched their desire towards apartments or condominiums. 
Affordability has been an important parameter. The White Paper on 
Households’ Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho), published by 
former Economic Planning Agency, calculated the degree of ability
3 to buy 
houses. The survey indicates that in Tokyo the ability to buy a single family 
house is 39% and apartment of condominium is 62% for a house of 167 square 
meter land area and 89 square meter floor area of single family house and 78 
square meter floor area of apartments. 
       
The fourth feature of housing markets in Japan is the subsidy in housing 
finance and this has implications for the type of houses that are constructed. 
Housing Loan Corporation (HLC) provides low interest rate loans to 
households for either construction or purchase of new houses. The interest 
rates are 2 to 3% lower than the market rate. There are, though, ceiling on the 
maximum obtainable loan and the HLC loan has to be supplemented by the 
loans from commercial banks. Moreover, HLC requires that certain conditions 
regarding floor space, price of house and income of borrower were met. The 
interest rates changes depending on the floor area. Seko (1993) found that the 
budget constraint in the demand function has jumps. For example, the floor 
spaces of many houses in Japan are around 120 square meters because for 
houses more than this size, HLC interest rates are higher. 
 
Transaction cost and government policies are some other features that 
characterize housing markets in Japan. Imperfections in housing market have 
made rental tenure as less favoured. The transaction and search cost of rental 
housing is very high. Changing a rental house is very expensive. This is 
reflected in the fact that the availability of large size rental housing is limited.  
 
Ito (1994) shows in his paper that the bequest tax has caused distortion in the 
housing market. The Japanese bequeathed  asset consists mostly of real 
estate. In fact, Japanese elderly, who plan to bequeath some assets, have 
strong incentive (i) to hold on to their principal residence, no matter, how 
mismatched for their requirements, and (ii) to purchase real estate with high 
                                                 
3 Ability = Attainable housing loan and financial assets*100/ Cost of house  70 Tiwari 
   
leverage. The later strategy is tax saving strategy as real estate is assessed at 
much less than market value and liability is deducted from the estate in full 
(Kanemoto, 1997). Housing loans for owner-occupied housing have only a 
partial tax benefit in Japan (in the form of tax credit). This in combination with 
large down-payment burden, works to delay the purchase of house in the life 
cycle (Ito, 1994). In contrast, landlords of rental housing property, especially 
with more than ten units, enjoy various tax benefits. As mentioned earlier that 
Land Lease Law and Building Lease Law in Japan protects tenants so much 
that no landlord would want to put high quality housing on the rental market. 
The result is that as household size grows, it is necessary to purchase a house 
instead of relocating to a large rental house, which is nonexistent. 
 
The overview of housing market above indicates that (i) the housing market in 
Japan is skewed in favour of ownership houses. Bequest motives and tax 
advantages associated with it make this form of tenure favourable. (ii) Large 
rental houses are non existent. This is a consequence of Laws that govern 
land and building leasing in Japan. Tenancy protection is very strong and 
does not leave much leverage for owners. (iii) Housing finance system has 
also shaped the quality and size of houses in Japan.  (iv) Affordability is a 
major driving element in the choice of houses. (v) Tax incentive has not 
played key role in the tenure choice in Japan. 
 
 
Statistical Overview of Tokyo Housing Market 
 
This paper uses the housing data from 1993 Housing Survey of Japan, 
Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Government of 
Japan (1993). The sample contains 245614 households (115928 households in 
rental and 129686 households in  ownership houses) living in Tokyo 
prefecture. Tokyo prefecture consists of 23 wards with Chiyoda-ku as the 
Central Business District (CBD).  
 
The mean and standard deviation of various house characteristics for owners 
and tenants are given in table 1. Our database does not have information on 
the value of ownership houses. The data does not have any other information 
like home loan repayments etc. which may help us in estimating instruments 
for imputed rent of ownership houses. We have used hedonic price function 
estimated for rental houses to impute rental value for ownership house. 
Imputed rental values for ownership houses may be viewed as rents which 
households pay to them. In a perfect housing market, the imputed rent of 
house should be equal to amortized house value at the rate of depreciation of 
house. The monthly-imputed average value of rent for ownership house in 
Tokyo is 164653.5 Yen and the average rent for rental houses is 81738.5 Yen. Housing Demand in Tokyo 71 
 
 
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Housing Characteristics for 
Houses in Tokyo 
Variable  Tenants  Owners 
  Mean  Std-Dev.  Mean  Std-
Dev. 
Distance from CBD (Km)  15.75  11.12  17.35  12.66 
House leading to public sewerage (if yes)   95%    92%   
Distance of hospital (meter)  257.39  221.52  287.84  246.84 
Distance of park (meter)  455.98  310.78  437.8  311.7 
Distance of public hall (meter)  448.23  268.59  455.55  279.7 
Distance from 6 m wide road (meter)  77.28  96.16  78.5  98.7 
Houses in good condition (if yes)  91%    95%   
Houses with elevator (if yes)  14%    15%   
House age (years)  14.88    18.12  11.59 
Floor area (m2)  32.63  22.85  96.4  46.3 
Houses with toilet (if yes)  98%    100%   
Houses with Water Closet (if yes)  95%    97%   
Number of toilets  1.05    1.39   
Houses with bath (if yes)  82%    97%   
Houses with Air Conditioner (if yes)  62%    91%   
Houses with Air Conditioner in 
individual rooms (if yes) 
58%    85%   
House with central Air Conditioner (if 
yes) 
5.3%    8.59%   
Houses with carport (if yes)  2.5%    16%   
Duration of sunshine (hours per day)  3.66  1.49  4.06  1.31 
Household size (number)  1.85  1.16  3.17  1.43 
Number of Rooms  2.21  1.13  5.04  1.73 




Number of observations  115928    129686   
 
Household housing demand is a function of various household 
characteristics and income distribution. Annual income distribution of 
households in Tokyo indicates that the lower 40% of households have 
annual income less than 4 million Yen.37% of households have annual income 72 Tiwari 
   
between 4 to 7 million Yen. 23% of households have income of more than 7 
million Yen per year.  
 
Occupation wise, 0.1% of tenants are farmers, 10.4% are self employed, 62.8% 
are employed in office or firms, 5% are public servant, 4.1% are employed 
part-time, 5.8% are students and rest are unemployed. 
 
The most preferred tenure in Japan is home-ownership. Every Japanese 
household has a dream of owning one's own house. Intergenerational 
transfers relating to housing are very common. For example, most households 
receive land/housing as bequests of gifts and many households receive 
financial assistance from their parents to facilitate home purchase 
 
 
Review of Past Studies 
 
Housing demand is a widely studied subject. Numerous literature exists that 
analyzes housing demand using different methodologies and for different 
geographical context (see of a review Muth and Goodman, 1989; Tiwari, 1996). 
In this paper, we review studies related to Japanese housing markets since 
the focus of present paper is on Japanese housing markets. While reviewing 
we will briefly mention the methodological difference and differences in 
results. Most of the methodologies used in Japanese papers are similar to 
papers on other housing markets and by reviewing methodologies used in 
these paper we  de facto review huge literature on international housing 
markets. There are five studies which estimate housing demand in Japan 
(Tiwari and Hasegawa, 2000; Moriizumi, 1993; Horioka 1988; Moriizumi and 
Takagi, 1983 and Yamada et al., 1976), using household level data. Later two 
studies use a single equation model of housing demand.  These studies 
estimate housing demand separately for tenants and owners. The literature on 
housing demand has convincingly indicated that households make their 
choice for tenure and housing consumption simultaneously. The studies by 
Tiwari et al., Moriizumi  (1993) and Horioka recognize the simultaneity of 
housing demand and tenure choice and their studies explicitly model the joint 
decision of housing demand and tenure following Lee and Trost (1978) 
methodology. 
 
Another point of difference among these studies is related to the measure of 
income. Yamada et al. (1976) uses pretax current income. Moriizumi et al. 
(1983) estimates an instrument for permanent income by regressing current 
income on life cycle variables. The fitted regression value is the permanent 
income used in their model and the residual is transitory income. Horioka 
(1988) estimates an equation similar to Moriizumi et al. and takes weighed Housing Demand in Tokyo 73 
 
average of current income and fitted value of regression as his instrument. To 
this, he adds the tax adjusted imputed value of rent for owner households to 
arrive at permanent income. Moriizumi (1993) uses a similar methodology for 
her permanent income measure. While they made adjustments for taxes, they 
did not deal with the subsequent problem of correlated regressor and error 
introduced by the procedure. The bias introduced could be considerable. 
Tiwari et al. estimate permanent income similar to Moriizumi (1983).  
 
Thirdly, the measure of price variable differs in these studies. Yamada et al. 
employ two household specific price indices (namely land rent divided by lot 
size and structural rent divided by floorspace), but such measures fail to 
control for differences in quality and other housing characteristics. Moriizumi 
and Takagi do not have a price variable in their model. Horioka (1988) uses 
price variable based on “user cost of capital” approach. The price variable so 
defined is product of unit price of ownership house and cost of capital. For 
rental housing they have used data on interregional differences in rent levels 
obtained from 1982 Zenkoku Bukka Tokei Chosa (National Survey of Prices) 
(Prime Minister’s Office, Statistics Bureau (1984, Table 2 pp.10-73)). Moriizumi 
(1993) uses a price variable similar to Horioka. Tiwari et al. estimate a Box-Cox 
hedonic function of rental values and estimate price indices for a standardized 
bundle of housing commodity at different locations in Tokyo. Their model 
uses similar price indices for owner and rental houses.   
 
The demand elasticity estimates of Moriizumi et al. and Yamada et al. indicate 
inelastic housing demand with income and prices. Horioka’s analysis 
indicates that the income elasticity of demand for housing in Japan in 1.4 
(highly elastic) and price elasticity of demand is –0.8 (inelastic). Elasticity 
estimates from Moriizumi (1993) analysis indicate an income elasticity of 0.11 
for owner households and -0.05 for tenants and price elasticity of -0.13 for 
owners and -0.67 for tenants. Tiwari et al. indicates that the elasticities of 
demand for rental housing is inelastic with respect to permanent income and 
price at 0.26 and –0.33 and for owner houses are inelastic with income as well 
as prices at 0.37 and –0.38.     
 
These five studies estimate elasticities, which vary over a wide range. The 
most fundamental difference is in choice of variable and geographical 
coverage. The income elasticity of housing demand is inelastic within a 
region but elastic across the regions (Mayo, Malpezzi and Gross, 1985). 
Horioka's (1988) study-sample includes households from all over the Japan 
while other studies are for Tokyo. This is the reason why Horioka’s income 
elasticity estimates are elastic while other two papers report income inelastic 
housing demand. The omission of price variable definitely biases income 
elasticity downwards (Polinsky, 1977) as has happened in Moriizumi et al 74 Tiwari 
   
(1983). The price variables included in other two papers, is also not 
representative of price of a standard commodity in various locations. Taking 
one price over a metropolitan region and a city (as in Horioka, 1988 and 
Moriizumi, 1993) leads to aggregation bias and biases the elasticity estimates 
upwards. Price per unit area is not the right measure of price (in Yamada et al., 
1976) as it ignores other characteristics of housing.  
 
Secondly these results are different due to measure of income variable. 
Literature on housing demand convincingly concludes that households make 
housing decisions based on their permanent income (Mayo, 1981). Permanent 
income elasticities are higher than current income elasticities. Moriizumi et al 
in their paper use permanent income, which is the fitted value of current 
income on characteristics, related to human capital. However, the permanent 
income elasticity of demand estimated in their paper is less than current 
income elasticity of demand. Yamada et al. (1976) uses current income. 
Horioka (1988) and Moriizumi (1993) estimates permanent income as sum of 
imputed rent for owners and weighted average of current income and 
instrument obtained as fitted value of regression of current income on human 
capital (following the methodology suggested by King and Dicks-Mireaux, 
1982). Their studies estimate tax and social security contribution of each 
family and subtract it from the permanent income estimates. The problem here 
is that they do not take care of the problem of correlated regressor and error 
introduced by this procedure.  
 
Two variables, which need discussion, are the price and income variables. We 
estimate hedonic price function to derive price variable for our model, which 
is discussed below. The measure of income that is employed is permanent 
income because use of current income imparts well-known downward bias to 
the income elasticity estimates.  
 
Earlier estimates of income and price elasticities of housing demand based on 
above five studies for Japan are inconclusive as policy parameters. We argue 
that it is not meaningful to estimate pure renter model or a pure owner model 
because, for example, in a pure owner model we ignore the possibility that the 
household could have rented shelter but in fact chose not to do so. Housing 
consumption decisions include the choice of tenure, size of house and type 
of structure, as described by the eight alternatives (appendix 1). 
 
Household chooses one of the above eight alternatives, based on his 
preferences, which can be represented in a hierarchical tree structure (see 
Figure 1). Households associate an index of desirability to each of these 
alternatives, which comprises all advantages and disadvantages for a given 
consumer into one scalar unit corresponding to the indirect utility function in Housing Demand in Tokyo 75 
 
neoclassical consumer theory. Uncertainty about quality and irrational 
valuation introduces a stochastic component into this index. Like the 
hypothesis of utility maximization under budget constraint the assumption is 
that each household will choose the alternative with the highest index of 
desirability. The following section provides a brief exposition of our 
econometric methodology, the estimation of hierarchical choice models.  
 
 
Housing Choice Model 
 
The simplest and most convenient functional form for a discrete choice 
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where C = {1,…,n} denotes the set of n discrete housing choice, Zi a vector of 
K attributes specific to choice i, and b a vector of corresponding taste 
parameters.
4 
Multinomial logit functions are easy to compute but they assume that the 
choice between any two alternatives is independent of the attributes and 
even the availability of any other alternative. This property is called 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). It implies that the cross-
elasticities of the probability shares must be equal (see, Boersch-Supan, 
1988). A relatively easy and intuitive generalization of the MNL specification- 
the nested multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1981) - is based on hierarchy 
of grouping of alternatives into subsets of similar choices. It is useful to 
visualize these hierarchical choice models as defining a pattern of linkages 
among clusters of alternatives. Each node of the linkages corresponds to a 
choice among clusters of alternatives. In the simple MNL model, all the 
elemental alternatives are linked directly. In a hierarchical choice model, some 
of the linkages lead to clusters of alternatives rather than to a single 
alternative. The choice within a cluster and the choices between the clusters 
within each nest are described by a conditional logit choice probability and 
conform to the IIA assumption. Our example of housing choice is represented 
                                                 
4 The choice probability can be derived from utility maximization by defining li
*=zi b + 
eias the stochastic utility of housing choice I where ei follows a type I extreme value 
distribution, see McFadden (1973). 76 Tiwari 
   
by the tree structure shown in Figure 1.  It may be pointed out here that a 
variety of tree structures are possible depending on positioning of tenure 
choice, unit size and type of  unit in the hierarchy. With three levels of 
choices, six tree structures are possible. We have tried these six trees besides 
the simple multinomial logit model. To keep the discussion simple and avoid 
too much of statistical details, we show only the best performing tree in 
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Mathematically, the choice probability of alternative ij…k in the NMNL model 
is  
) ... | ( * ... * ) | ( * ) ( ) ... ( ji m k P i j P i P mk ij P =       (2) 
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m
i j n s i j n m s i j n m I
i j n s i j n m s i j n m I
ji n m P     (3) 
where the "inclusive values" I(m,…,j,i) are recursively defined by  
I(k,…,j, i) = b k Z /s (k,…,j, i)          (4) 
￿ =
' )} , ,..., ( / ) , ,..., , ( * ) , ,..., , ( exp{ log ) , ,..., (
' '
m
i j n s i j n m s i j n m I i j n I   (5) 
and weighted by "similarity coefficients" s(m,…,j,i). These similarity 
coefficients refer to their respective clusters and characterize the degree of 
substitutability among the alternatives in the cluster. Setting all the similarity 
coefficients to unity restricts NMNL to MNL specification. Hence the 
difference of the similarity coefficients from unity is a measure of the 
importance of similarities and dissimilarities among choices. Estimation of the 
NMNL can be done by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique.  
 
Specifications of Demand Equations 
 
In this section we will discuss the explanatory variables that determine the 
housing demand.  
HEDON = Hedonic index as a measure of user cost 
INCOME = Permanent income before taxes 
AGE = Age of household head 
HSIZE = Household size 
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Housing Price 
The measure of house price is the user cost of housing capital. Since we do 
not have information about house price for ownership houses, we estimate 
imputed rent for owners, based on hedonic indexes computed on renter 
sample, as the user cost. The first step is to estimate a hedonic function from 
the renter sub-sample for Tokyo. The methodology adopted is discussed 
below.  
 
Let Z = Zi = (Z1,...,Zn)  n i ,..., 1 = " be a vector of housing characteristics and 
P(Z) be a hedonic price function defined by some market clearing conditions. 
The household decision is characterized by the utility function  
 
  Z), U(X, = U             (6) 
 
where X is a composite commodity other than housing whose price is unity. 
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint  
 
  X.   +   P(Z)Z   =   Y              (7) 
 





  =   P
i
i               (8)  
 
where Pi is the implicit prices that households have assigned to characteristic 
i. 
Estimation of these implicit prices can be done by regressing market values of 
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Since we do not have any prior notions about the shape of the hedonic 
function, we estimate alternative forms of Box-Cox transformations. W e 
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where the b ’s are the market –determined parameters, l is a parameter used 
to transform housing characteristics to do Box-Cox analysis, and t  is 
transformation parameter for rent (P). Nonlinear methods are used to find 
optimal values of transformation parameters. The first derivative of rents with 
respect to housing characteristics in the above equation, are the implicit 
prices. The hedonic function is used to estimate price indices as well as 
imputed rent for owner houses. 
 
We do not report parameter estimates of various variables of the hedonic 
function, as they are of less interest than the implicit prices i.e. the marginal 
price of various variables that determine the house price. In table 2, we 
present these implicit prices. It may be pointed out here that the point 
estimates of various transformation coefficients are significant and very 
different from Zero (A value of zero indicates that the functional form is Log-
linear, a most commonly used functional form in the housing literature). The 
coefficients of all the attributes of housing are significant.  
 
Table 2: Implicit Prices for Housing Characteristics 
Variables  Japanese Yen 
Distance from CBD(Km)  -1008.5 (0.7373) 
Area of house (Sqm)  608.31 (0.7355) 
Duration of sunlight (hr)  660.09 (0.2576) 
Number of rooms  7172.2 (0.5348) 
Age of House (years)  -724.42 (0.8896) 
Dummy for sewer (1=yes; 0=No)  1684.3  
Dummy for Good Condition (1=yes; 0=No)  5098.5 
Dummy for Elevator (1=yes; 0=No)  19621 
Dummy for toilet (1=yes; 0=No)  16980 
Dummy for Bath (1=yes; 0=No)  26476 
Dummy for WC (1=yes; 0=No)  11517 
Dummy for second toilet (1=yes; 0=No)  3568.9 
Dummy for Aircon (1=yes; 0=No)  4704.4 
Dummy for carport (1=yes; 0=No)  11897 
Transformation parameter for dependent variable  0.20 Housing Demand in Tokyo 81 
 
Variables  Japanese Yen 
R-squared  0.6277 
Note: In Box-Cox quadratic model figures in bracket represent the transformation 
coefficient for the    
          variable. The transformation  coefficients for dummy variables are 1.  
         All coefficients are significant at 5%. 
         *Insignificant 
 
The implicit prices are very interesting as they indicate the market price of 
each additional unit of housing characteristic. Distance has a negative 
coefficient. A house 1 Km away from CBD of Chiyoda-ku would reduce the 
rent by 1008 yen, ceteris paribus. Area is an important determinant of rent. 
An increase in house area by 1 square meter increases the rent by 608 yen. 
The dummies for all amenities like toilet, bath and air-conditioner have 
positive significant coefficients. House age variable indicates that new 
houses are more expensive than old ones. Sunshine has positive coefficient, 
though this variable is not significant. 
 
Since we do not have information about house values for ownership houses, 
we were unable to compute price indices for ownership houses separately. 
Hedonic rent indexes are estimated from hedonic function of renter 
households and estimated at each dwelling. This yields an imputed rent also 
applicable to owner housing. It is well known in housing literature that out-
of-pocket costs are perceived differently by tenants and owners but our 
measure uses same function. We, therefore, allow the general attractiveness 
of owning versus renting - the freedom of disposition, by letting the hedonic 
indexes interact with tenure choice. We obtain two hedonic prices: 
 
HEDONO = imputed hedonic rent, if dwelling is owner occupied, and 0, 
otherwise 
HEDONR = imputed hedonic rent, if dwelling is rented, and 0, otherwise. 
 
In a choice among several alternatives, the attributes of all choices enter the 
decision process of the households. In econometric terms we have to specify 
the explanatory variables for all alternatives in the choice probabilities. 
However, only attributes of chosen alternatives are observed, not those of 
rejected alternatives. We impute the attributes of a hypothetical ( an 
alternative not chosen) as the sample average of these attributes in the 
population. 
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Permanent Income  
 
As discussed earlier the housing demand is a function of permanent income. 
Following the literature we estimate permanent income function in terms of 
human capital of households. We use a procedure similar to Moriizumi (1983). 
Table 3 presents estimated permanent income function. 
 
Table 3: Permanent Income Function 
Dependent variable: Log (Annual income) 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  T-stat 
Constant  14.011   
Age of household head (years)  0.009  125.44 
Dummy for occupation as farmer (1-yes; 0-no)  0.598  16.7 
Dummy for occupation as self employed (1-yes; 0-no)  0.876  222.8 
Dummy for occupation as company employed  
(1-yes; 0-no) 
0.979  357.2 
Dummy for occupation as public servant (1-yes; 0-no)  1.212  236.7 
Dummy for occupation as part-time (1-yes; 0-no)  0.131  23.8 
R-squared  0.29   
 
The age has a positive coefficient as expected. The dummies for occupation 
indicate that public servants have the highest income followed by company 
employed and then by self employed, farmers and part-timers in that order. 
 
In our model, income varies by household and is not alternative specific, it 
drops out as irrelevant for a pair wise comparison of alternatives. Therefore, 
we create an interaction of income with each alternative by multiplying it by a 
set of alternative specific dummy variables. Specifically, we exploit the 
symmetrical tree structures and let income interact with a dummy variable for 
each dimension of choice so that we obtain three income variables: 
 
INCOME.RENT = INCOME, if household is tenant 
                           = 0, if household is owner 
INCOME.SFM  = INCOME, if household lives in single family structure 
                           = 0, if household lives in a multifamily structure 
INCOME.14R   = INCOME, if household lives in dwelling with 1-4 rooms 




Age of the household head and household size are the two other variables 
included in the equation. Age takes account of the difference in the life-cycle Housing Demand in Tokyo 83 
 
pattern of the housing consumption within each stratum. Household size 
measures the household response in relation to changes in household size.  
 
 
Estimation of Demand Equations  
 
We estimate seven alternative specifications of demand model. One of them is 
the multinomial logit model and six are various nested trees (derived from 
hierarchical positioning of tenure choice, unit size and unit type, one of them 
is shown in Figure 1). To economize on computation costs, all estimations are 
based on small sub-sample of 9600 households (nearly 4% of original data 
set) drawn randomly from the larger population and estimated by maximum 
likelihood procedure. The method proved extremely cost efficient without 
causing major losses in precision of the estimates. 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation result for the best performing tree. To avoid 
unnecessary statistical detail we do not present results for all trees. The 
performance of trees is evaluated on the basis of various performance 
statistics like Likelihood value, correct prediction
5, McFadden R
2 and also 
dissimilarity coefficients. All the nested trees performed better than simple 
MNL. The estimated coefficients for the tree, which performed most 
satisfactorily, are presented in Table 4. The upper rows in table 4 report 
summary measures on fit.  
 
The estimated coefficients in table 4 represent the taste parameters of the 
utility function underlying our demand functions. As discussed earlier, 
income, age and size interact with indicator variables for each of the three 
choice dimensions. The coefficients of income, age and size in each 
alternative can be calculated by adding up the three interactions. For example, 
the income effect in the alternative of large (five or more rooms) single-family 
rental house is composed of the income effect of renting and income effect of 
single family house. Note that in this example we eliminate the contribution of 
size choice because large dwellings are the reference or excluded case. The 
household size and household head age variables are significant. 
 
 
Price Elasticity of Housing Demand  
 
When the coefficients of table 4 are transformed into elasticity of choice 
                                                 
5 Amemiya (1981) gives an extensive discussion of goodness of fit measures in discrete 
choice models. 84 Tiwari 
   
probabilities with respect to income and housing price variables, the result is 
a convenient and intuitive sense of their magnitudes for comparison across 
strata. The elasticity measures the percentage changes in the market share of 
housing alternative i when the kth attribute of alternative j is changed by one 
percent. For example, it measures the percentage change in the market share 
of large single family rental housing when the rent of large apartments is 
increased by one percent. The NMNL model produces for  
 
Table 4: Demand Equation  
Estimates for the tree shown in Figure 1 
Performance statistics 
Likelihood  -8435 
R-squared  0.58 
Correctly predicted (%)  67.9 
Estimation Coefficients 
Alternative specific variables  Coefficients (T-statistics) 
HEDONR  -0.12 (82.6) 
HEDONO  -0.005 (3.6) 
Agent specific variables   
INCOME*RENT  -0.0001 (1.16) 
INCOME*SFM  0.0004 (1.51) 
INCOME*14R  -0.0012 (5.59) 
SIZE*RENT  -0.09 (8.34) 
SIZE*SFM  0.5 (17.5) 
SIZE*14R  -0.28 (10.2) 
AGE*RENT  -0.015 (18.6) 
AGE*SFM  0.07 (31.4) 
AGE*14R  -0.014 (7.4) 
Alternative specific constants   
R-SF-14  -3.18 (13.03) 
R-SF-5  -5.63 (32.78) 
R-MF-14  3.60 (23.9) 
R-MF-5  -0.42 (6.03) 
O-SF-14  -7.52 (30.1) 
O-SF-5  -3.83 (21.6) 
O-MF-14  2.84 (19.2) 
Dissimilarity parameters 
Bottom far left  1.78 (68.1) 
Bottom left  3.64 (76.3) 
Bottom far right  0.79 (9.6) 
Bottom right  0.89 (7.6) 
Top left  0.08 (249.9) 
Top right  0.01 (979.7) Housing Demand in Tokyo 85 
 
 
each variable an entire array of cross elasticity that describes the changes in 
the market share of each alternative in response to the changes of this 
variable in all other alternatives. For the pooled sample, the elasticity matrix 
for the hedonic rent variable is shown in table 5. All elasticties are evaluated 
at sample means. The housing alternatives are denoted by their indexes as 
discussed earlier. The hierarchy of the tree is reflected in the block structure 
of equal or unequal elasticities. The first row describes the reaction of the 
eight market shares to an increase in the out-of-pocket cost of small-rental-
single family house by one percent. The S -T-U (size-tenure-unit type) 
structure forces this reaction to be equal across the two ownership houses 
(their market share increases by 0.34%) and to be equal across all large size 
houses (their market share increases by 0.03%). Each column lists t he 
response of a given market share on a change in the price of each alternative.  
 
The price elasticities indicate that if price of a rental housing increases the 
corresponding alternative's market share decreases and there is a switch to 
other alternatives and the most pronounced increase is in owner housing 
alternatives. For example, an increase in price of single family-rental-large size 
houses by one percent reduces its market share by 5.1%, reduces market 
share of single-family rental small size house by 4.7%. This increases the 
market share of both large (more than 4 rooms) and small (1 to 4 rooms) single 
family ownership houses. There is very little rise in the share of multi-family 
houses and most of the shift is from single family rental houses to single 
family ownership houses. Similarly, an increase in the price of a multi family-
ownership house by one percent reduces the market share of this alternative 
but by a very small percentage. This result supports the view that the demand 
pattern is changing due to affordability parameters. Households constrained 
by their wealth do not change their demand for multi-family ownership 
houses much with increase in the price. Reason is obviously that the 
substitution within ownership tenure for multi family houses (i.e. to single 
family house) is unaffordable for a large segment of population. The own 
price elasticities vary over a large range between -0.03 to -5.1. The negative 
own price elasticity for rental housing indicates Japanese choice of 
ownership housing.  
 
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand  
 
The income elasticities are composed of the elasticities with respect to each 
of the three income choice-dimension interactions. The sum of three 
components gives a comprehensive income elasticity. These comprehensive 
elasticities describe the percentage change in the market share of each 
alternative when the household's permanent income if increased by one 86 Tiwari 
   
percent and are shown in table 5. The income elasticities indicate that with 
increase in household income Japanese household would choose ownership 
houses. All income elasticities for owner houses are positive and for rental 
houses are negative. With rise in income there is definitely a switch towards 
ownership houses. The income elasticity of multi family ownership houses is 
higher than single family ownership houses. High land cost is a major factor, 
which constrains households from owning single family houses.  
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Impact of Other Variables on Housing Demand 
 
If the household size increases by 1%, the shift in housing choice is towards 
single family ownership houses. The share of single family rental houses 
decreases drastically by more than 13% for both large and small houses 
respectively. There is a slight increase in the market share of multi family 
rental houses as well but this may be viewed as income constrained 
household first move to large multi-family rental houses before accumulating 
enough wealth to move to single family ownership houses. Single family 
ownership houses are preferred by large families while multi family houses are 
preferred by nucleus families.  
 
Another important variable that determines housing demand is age of 
household head. Table 5 indicates that if age of household head increases by 
1%, the market share of single family and multi family ownership houses 
increases. The increase in the market share of single family ownership houses 





Few studies have been conducted to estimate housing demand in Japan. 
These studies have estimated demand function where measure of demand is 
housing expenditure. The results are far from conclusive and the estimates of 
price and income elasticities vary over a wide range from elastic to inelastic. 
We argue that it is not meaningful to estimate pure renter model or a pure 
owner model because, for example, in a pure owner model we ignore the 
possibility that the household could have rented shelter but in fact chose not 
to do so. Measuring the volume of housing services as housing expenditure, 
as is done in previous research, essentially ignores this heterogeneity, and 
for large number of policy purposes like impact of tax on tenure choice, choice 
between owning and renting etc., the distribution of housing consumption 
into qualitatively different categories is of more interest than an aggregate 
qualitative measure of housing expenditure alone. We use a nested 
multinomial logit model (NMNL) as the basic analytical tool for our analysis. 
The microeconomic and econometric foundations of NMNL models 
encompass the elegant theory of housing economics of a utility maximizing 
household. NMNL models impose a hierarchical structure on the choice set 
that can be visualized in the form of a decision tree. Three dimensions of 
choice, tenure, dwelling size (as number of rooms) and structure type (as type 
of unit) generate these steps of clustering. This paper estimates the choice 
probabilities and demand elasticities of various housing alternatives for 
Tokyo using 1993 housing survey data for 23 wards. Housing Demand in Tokyo 89 
 
 
The results of the demand analysis indicates that households choose 
ownership houses. As the income grows or the size of household increases, 
there is a requirement for bigger houses. Most of the rental houses in Tokyo 
are smaller in size. Since a large size rental house is not easily available, 
households move to ownership houses. The income elasticity of market share 
of ownership house is positive and ranges between 0.16 to 0.34. However, 
income elasticity for rental houses is negative ranging between -0.17 to -0.57.   
 
Price is another important variable determining the choice of house. An 
increase in the price of rental houses reduces its demand by much larger 
proportion than the corresponding decline in demand for ownership houses 
with an increase in price of ownership houses. The own price elasticity varies 
over a large range from  -0.03 to      -5.1 with smaller in magnitude for 
ownership houses and larger for rental houses. Rental houses lack in quality 
as mentioned earlier. Households live in rental houses during their earlier 
stage of demographics. As household size and age increases, they move to 
ownership houses.  
 
Housing in Tokyo is an outcome of various cultural, policy and demographic 
behaviour. Bequest motive of elderly in Japan is very high and real estate is 
major form of wealth transfer. An important finding is that when the price of 
large ownership houses increase, there is a switch towards large rental 
houses rather than other alternatives. This indicates that there is a market for 
large size rental houses in Tokyo. However, in Tokyo regulations have 
affected the outcomes in housing markets to a large extent. Laws like Land 
Lease Law or Building Lease Law, which protect tenants, have constrained 
the supply of quality rental housing. The consequence of such constraint is 
one of the causes of high price of ownership houses in Tokyo. Housing 
finance system provides subsidy for purchase or construction of ownership 
houses. Though there are some restrictions regarding the size of houses. 
These restrictions to a large extent determine the type of housing supplied in 
Tokyo. The results also support the view that with increase in income, the 
market share of multi-family ownership houses would increase much larger 
than single family ownership houses. Affordability is the major criteria 
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Appendix 1: Design of Alternatives 
 
The design of alternatives is very important for discrete choice analysis of 
housing demand. In Japan, there is wide difference between rental and owner 
house area. In 1999, the average area of ownership house in Japan is 121 
square meter as compared to 45 square meter in case of rental houses (Figure 
A.1). There has been steady improvement in average area of ownership 
houses but average rental house area has not changed much. The 
distribution of rental houses with area (Figure A.2) indicates that 73% of 
rental houses have area less than 50 square meter. Another 17% of rental 
houses have area between 50 and 70 square meter. 
 
Table A.1: Statistics relevant for the tree structure 
Number of Rooms   Percentage Share   
Up to 4  68%   
5 or more  32%   
Room-Tenure Cross Tabulation 
  Owner (100%)  Rental (100%) 
Up to 4  42%  97% 
5 or more  58%  3% 
Room-Unit type Cross Tabulation 
  Single family (100%)  Multi 
family(100%) 
Up to 4  36%  92% 
5 or more  64%  8% 
Room-Unit type Cross Tabulation – By Tenure 
Ownership houses 
  Single family (100%)  Multifamily 
(100%) 
Up to 4  29%  74% 
5 or more  71%  26% 
Rental houses 
  Single family (100%)  Multifamily 
(100%) 
Up to 4  85%  99% 
5 or more  15%  1% 
Tenure- Unit type Cross Tabulation 
  Single family  Multi family 
Owner houses (100%)  71%  29% 
Rental houses (100%)  15%  85% 
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Table A.2: Minimum and targeted standards recommended by  
Government in Japan 
No of Persons  Minimum Standard  Targeted Standard 
1  1DK(2 rooms)  25 Sqm  1DK(2 rooms)  43Sqm 
2  1DK(2 rooms)  29Sqm  1LDK(3 rooms)  55Sqm 
3  2DK(3 rooms)  39Sqm  2LDK(4 rooms)  75Sqm 
4  3DK(4 rooms)  50Sqm  3LDK(5 rooms)  91Sqm 
5  3DK(4 rooms)  56Sqm  4LDK(6 rooms)  104Sqm 
6  4DK(5 rooms)  66Sqm  4LDK(6 rooms)  112Sqm 
Source: A Quick Look at Housing in Japan, 4
th Edition, 1998, The Building Center of 
Japan, Tokyo. 
Note:   Japanese houses have combined use of living room, dining room and kitchen 
either all three together or two of these components together.  
L referes to living  
  D refers to Dining 
  K referes to kitchen 
 
The distribution of houses by tenure (rental versus ownership), size (small 
versus large) and unit type (single family versus multi family) is skewed at 
times. As shown in table A.1, there are 68% of houses, which have less than 5 
rooms and 32% of houses have 5 or more rooms. Tenure wise distribution 
indicates that most of 5 or more room houses are ownership houses (58%). 
Only three percent of rental houses have 5 or more rooms. Unit type wise as 
well, most of the large houses (5 or more rooms) belong to single family 
houses (64%) and only 8% of multi family houses have 5 or more rooms. It 
becomes difficult to design housing alternatives.  
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We use another information to supplement our data to enable us in designing 
alternatives. Japanese Government has laid down policies for minimum and 
targeted standards for households (table A.2). A household with 4 members 
should have a minimum of 50 square meter (4 rooms) and targeted 91 square 
meter (5 rooms) house. 
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Based on above information we classify housing choices in following eight 
alternatives.  
 
1.  R-S-14: Rent, single family house, 1-4 rooms 
2.  R-SF-5: Rent, single family house, 5+ rooms 
3.  R-MF-14: Rent, multi-family house, 1-4 rooms 
4.  R-MF-5: Rent, multi-family house, 5+ rooms 
5.  O-SF-14: Own, single family house, 1-4 rooms 
6.  O-SF-5: Own, single family house, 5+ rooms 
7.  O-MF-14: Own, multi-family house, 1-4 rooms 
8.  O-MF-5: Own, multi-family house, 5+ rooms 
 